Software / code / prosody
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util/x509.lua @ 13801:a5d5fefb8b68 13.0
mod_tls: Enable Prosody's certificate checking for incoming s2s connections (fixes #1916) (thanks Damian, Zash)
Various options in Prosody allow control over the behaviour of the certificate
verification process For example, some deployments choose to allow falling
back to traditional "dialback" authentication (XEP-0220), while others verify
via DANE, hard-coded fingerprints, or other custom plugins.
Implementing this flexibility requires us to override OpenSSL's default
certificate verification, to allow Prosody to verify the certificate itself,
apply custom policies and make decisions based on the outcome.
To enable our custom logic, we have to suppress OpenSSL's default behaviour of
aborting the connection with a TLS alert message. With LuaSec, this can be
achieved by using the verifyext "lsec_continue" flag.
We also need to use the lsec_ignore_purpose flag, because XMPP s2s uses server
certificates as "client" certificates (for mutual TLS verification in outgoing
s2s connections).
Commit 99d2100d2918 moved these settings out of the defaults and into mod_s2s,
because we only really need these changes for s2s, and they should be opt-in,
rather than automatically applied to all TLS services we offer.
That commit was incomplete, because it only added the flags for incoming
direct TLS connections. StartTLS connections are handled by mod_tls, which was
not applying the lsec_* flags. It previously worked because they were already
in the defaults.
This resulted in incoming s2s connections with "invalid" certificates being
aborted early by OpenSSL, even if settings such as `s2s_secure_auth = false`
or DANE were present in the config.
Outgoing s2s connections inherit verify "none" from the defaults, which means
OpenSSL will receive the cert but will not terminate the connection when it is
deemed invalid. This means we don't need lsec_continue there, and we also
don't need lsec_ignore_purpose (because the remote peer is a "server").
Wondering why we can't just use verify "none" for incoming s2s? It's because
in that mode, OpenSSL won't request a certificate from the peer for incoming
connections. Setting verify "peer" is how you ask OpenSSL to request a
certificate from the client, but also what triggers its built-in verification.
| author | Matthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| date | Tue, 01 Apr 2025 17:26:56 +0100 |
| parent | 13729:b50eadfddd57 |
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-- Prosody IM -- Copyright (C) 2010 Matthew Wild -- Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Aurich -- -- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the -- COPYING file in the source package for more information. -- -- TODO: I feel a fair amount of this logic should be integrated into Luasec, -- so that everyone isn't re-inventing the wheel. Dependencies on -- IDN libraries complicate that. -- [TLS-CERTS] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125.html -- Obsolete -- [TLS-IDENT] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525.html -- [XMPP-CORE] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6120.html -- [SRV-ID] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4985.html -- [IDNA] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890.html -- [LDAP] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4519.html -- [PKIX] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280.html local nameprep = require "prosody.util.encodings".stringprep.nameprep; local idna_to_ascii = require "prosody.util.encodings".idna.to_ascii; local idna_to_unicode = require "prosody.util.encodings".idna.to_unicode; local base64 = require "prosody.util.encodings".base64; local log = require "prosody.util.logger".init("x509"); local mt = require "prosody.util.multitable"; local s_format = string.format; local ipairs = ipairs; local _ENV = nil; -- luacheck: std none local oid_commonname = "2.5.4.3"; -- [LDAP] 2.3 local oid_subjectaltname = "2.5.29.17"; -- [PKIX] 4.2.1.6 local oid_xmppaddr = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"; -- [XMPP-CORE] local oid_dnssrv = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"; -- [SRV-ID] -- Compare a hostname (possibly international) with asserted names extracted from a certificate. -- This function follows the rules laid out in section 6.3 of [TLS-IDENT] -- -- A wildcard ("*") all by itself is allowed only as the left-most label local function compare_dnsname(host, asserted_names) -- TODO: Sufficient normalization? Review relevant specs. local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) if norm_host == nil then log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host) return false end norm_host = norm_host:lower() local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label for i=1,#asserted_names do local name = asserted_names[i] if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); return true end -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" if name:match("^%*%.") then local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); return true end end end return false end -- Compare an XMPP domain name with the asserted id-on-xmppAddr -- identities extracted from a certificate. Both are UTF8 strings. -- -- Per [XMPP-CORE], matches against asserted identities don't include -- wildcards, so we just do a normalize on both and then a string comparison -- -- TODO: Support for full JIDs? local function compare_xmppaddr(host, asserted_names) local norm_host = nameprep(host) for i=1,#asserted_names do local name = asserted_names[i] -- We only want to match against bare domains right now, not -- those crazy full-er JIDs. if name:match("[@/]") then log("debug", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s because it's not a bare domain", name) else local norm_name = nameprep(name) if norm_name == nil then log("info", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s, failed nameprep!", name) else if norm_host == norm_name then log("debug", "Cert xmppAddr %s matched hostname", name) return true end end end end return false end -- Compare a host + service against the asserted id-on-dnsSRV (SRV-ID) -- identities extracted from a certificate. -- -- Per [SRV-ID], the asserted identities will be encoded in ASCII via ToASCII. -- Comparison is done case-insensitively, and a wildcard ("*") all by itself -- is allowed only as the left-most non-service label. local function compare_srvname(host, service, asserted_names) local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) if norm_host == nil then log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host); return false end -- Service names start with a "_" if service:match("^_") == nil then service = "_"..service end norm_host = norm_host:lower(); local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label for i=1,#asserted_names do local asserted_service, name = asserted_names[i]:match("^(_[^.]+)%.(.*)"); if service == asserted_service then if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); return true; end -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" if name:match("^%*%.") then local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name) return true end end if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); return true end end end return false end local function verify_identity(host, service, cert) if cert.setencode then cert:setencode("utf8"); end local ext = cert:extensions() if ext[oid_subjectaltname] then local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname]; if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then if service == "_xmpp-client" or service == "_xmpp-server" then if compare_xmppaddr(host, sans[oid_xmppaddr]) then return true end end end if sans[oid_dnssrv] then -- Only check srvNames if the caller specified a service if service and compare_srvname(host, service, sans[oid_dnssrv]) then return true end end if sans["dNSName"] then if compare_dnsname(host, sans["dNSName"]) then return true end end end -- Per [TLS-IDENT] ignore the Common Name -- The server identity can only be expressed in the subjectAltNames extension; -- it is no longer valid to use the commonName RDN, known as CN-ID in [TLS-CERTS]. -- If all else fails, well, why should we be any different? return false end -- TODO Support other SANs local function get_identities(cert) --> map of names to sets of services if cert.setencode then cert:setencode("utf8"); end local names = mt.new(); local ext = cert:extensions(); local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname]; if sans then if sans["dNSName"] then -- Valid for any service for _, name in ipairs(sans["dNSName"]) do local is_wildcard = name:sub(1, 2) == "*."; if is_wildcard then name = name:sub(3); end name = idna_to_unicode(nameprep(name)); if name then if is_wildcard then name = "*." .. name; end names:set(name, "*", true); end end end if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then for _, name in ipairs(sans[oid_xmppaddr]) do name = nameprep(name); if name then names:set(name, "xmpp-client", true); names:set(name, "xmpp-server", true); end end end if sans[oid_dnssrv] then for _, srvname in ipairs(sans[oid_dnssrv]) do local srv, name = srvname:match("^_([^.]+)%.(.*)"); if srv then name = nameprep(name); if name then names:set(name, srv, true); end end end end end local subject = cert:subject(); for i = 1, #subject do local dn = subject[i]; if dn.oid == oid_commonname then local name = nameprep(dn.value); if name and idna_to_ascii(name) then names:set(name, "*", true); end end end return names.data; end local pat = "%-%-%-%-%-BEGIN ([A-Z ]+)%-%-%-%-%-\r?\n".. "([0-9A-Za-z+/=\r\n]*)\r?\n%-%-%-%-%-END %1%-%-%-%-%-"; local function pem2der(pem) local typ, data = pem:match(pat); if typ and data then return base64.decode(data), typ; end end local wrap = ('.'):rep(64); local envelope = "-----BEGIN %s-----\n%s\n-----END %s-----\n" local function der2pem(data, typ) typ = typ and typ:upper() or "CERTIFICATE"; data = base64.encode(data); return s_format(envelope, typ, data:gsub(wrap, '%0\n', (#data-1)/64), typ); end return { verify_identity = verify_identity; get_identities = get_identities; pem2der = pem2der; der2pem = der2pem; };