Software / code / prosody
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util/sasl.lua @ 13801:a5d5fefb8b68 13.0
mod_tls: Enable Prosody's certificate checking for incoming s2s connections (fixes #1916) (thanks Damian, Zash)
Various options in Prosody allow control over the behaviour of the certificate
verification process For example, some deployments choose to allow falling
back to traditional "dialback" authentication (XEP-0220), while others verify
via DANE, hard-coded fingerprints, or other custom plugins.
Implementing this flexibility requires us to override OpenSSL's default
certificate verification, to allow Prosody to verify the certificate itself,
apply custom policies and make decisions based on the outcome.
To enable our custom logic, we have to suppress OpenSSL's default behaviour of
aborting the connection with a TLS alert message. With LuaSec, this can be
achieved by using the verifyext "lsec_continue" flag.
We also need to use the lsec_ignore_purpose flag, because XMPP s2s uses server
certificates as "client" certificates (for mutual TLS verification in outgoing
s2s connections).
Commit 99d2100d2918 moved these settings out of the defaults and into mod_s2s,
because we only really need these changes for s2s, and they should be opt-in,
rather than automatically applied to all TLS services we offer.
That commit was incomplete, because it only added the flags for incoming
direct TLS connections. StartTLS connections are handled by mod_tls, which was
not applying the lsec_* flags. It previously worked because they were already
in the defaults.
This resulted in incoming s2s connections with "invalid" certificates being
aborted early by OpenSSL, even if settings such as `s2s_secure_auth = false`
or DANE were present in the config.
Outgoing s2s connections inherit verify "none" from the defaults, which means
OpenSSL will receive the cert but will not terminate the connection when it is
deemed invalid. This means we don't need lsec_continue there, and we also
don't need lsec_ignore_purpose (because the remote peer is a "server").
Wondering why we can't just use verify "none" for incoming s2s? It's because
in that mode, OpenSSL won't request a certificate from the peer for incoming
connections. Setting verify "peer" is how you ask OpenSSL to request a
certificate from the client, but also what triggers its built-in verification.
| author | Matthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| date | Tue, 01 Apr 2025 17:26:56 +0100 |
| parent | 13758:fc97319ef48e |
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-- sasl.lua v0.4 -- Copyright (C) 2008-2010 Tobias Markmann -- -- All rights reserved. -- -- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -- -- * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -- * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -- * Neither the name of Tobias Markmann nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -- -- THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. local pairs, ipairs = pairs, ipairs; local t_insert = table.insert; local type = type local setmetatable = setmetatable; local assert = assert; local require = require; local _ENV = nil; -- luacheck: std none --[[ Authentication Backend Prototypes: state = false : disabled state = true : enabled state = nil : non-existent Channel Binding: To enable support of channel binding in some mechanisms you need to provide appropriate callbacks in a table at profile.cb. Example: profile.cb["tls-unique"] = function(self) return self.user end ]] local method = {}; method.__index = method; local registered_mechanisms = {}; local backend_mechanism = {}; local mechanism_channelbindings = {}; -- register a new SASL mechanism local function registerMechanism(name, backends, f, cb_backends) assert(type(name) == "string", "Parameter name MUST be a string."); assert(type(backends) == "string" or type(backends) == "table", "Parameter backends MUST be either a string or a table."); assert(type(f) == "function", "Parameter f MUST be a function."); if cb_backends then assert(type(cb_backends) == "table"); end registered_mechanisms[name] = f if cb_backends then mechanism_channelbindings[name] = {}; for _, cb_name in ipairs(cb_backends) do mechanism_channelbindings[name][cb_name] = true; end end for _, backend_name in ipairs(backends) do if backend_mechanism[backend_name] == nil then backend_mechanism[backend_name] = {}; end t_insert(backend_mechanism[backend_name], name); end end -- create a new SASL object which can be used to authenticate clients local function new(realm, profile, userdata) local mechanisms = profile.mechanisms; if not mechanisms then mechanisms = {}; for backend in pairs(profile) do if backend_mechanism[backend] then for _, mechanism in ipairs(backend_mechanism[backend]) do mechanisms[mechanism] = true; end end end profile.mechanisms = mechanisms; end return setmetatable({ profile = profile, realm = realm, mechs = mechanisms, userdata = userdata }, method); end -- add a channel binding handler function method:add_cb_handler(name, f) if type(self.profile.cb) ~= "table" then self.profile.cb = {}; end self.profile.cb[name] = f; return self; end -- get a fresh clone with the same realm and profile function method:clean_clone() return new(self.realm, self.profile, self.userdata) end -- get a list of possible SASL mechanisms to use function method:mechanisms() local current_mechs = {}; for mech, _ in pairs(self.mechs) do if mechanism_channelbindings[mech] then if self.profile.cb then local ok = false; for cb_name, _ in pairs(self.profile.cb) do if mechanism_channelbindings[mech][cb_name] then ok = true; end end if ok == true then current_mechs[mech] = true; end end else current_mechs[mech] = true; end end return current_mechs; end -- select a mechanism to use function method:select(mechanism) if not self.selected and self.mechs[mechanism] then self.selected = mechanism; return true; end end -- feed new messages to process into the library function method:process(message) --if message == "" or message == nil then return "failure", "malformed-request" end return registered_mechanisms[self.selected](self, message); end -- load the mechanisms require "prosody.util.sasl.plain" .init(registerMechanism); require "prosody.util.sasl.anonymous" .init(registerMechanism); require "prosody.util.sasl.oauthbearer" .init(registerMechanism); require "prosody.util.sasl.scram" .init(registerMechanism); require "prosody.util.sasl.external" .init(registerMechanism); return { registerMechanism = registerMechanism; new = new; };