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util/paseto.lua @ 13801:a5d5fefb8b68 13.0
mod_tls: Enable Prosody's certificate checking for incoming s2s connections (fixes #1916) (thanks Damian, Zash)
Various options in Prosody allow control over the behaviour of the certificate
verification process For example, some deployments choose to allow falling
back to traditional "dialback" authentication (XEP-0220), while others verify
via DANE, hard-coded fingerprints, or other custom plugins.
Implementing this flexibility requires us to override OpenSSL's default
certificate verification, to allow Prosody to verify the certificate itself,
apply custom policies and make decisions based on the outcome.
To enable our custom logic, we have to suppress OpenSSL's default behaviour of
aborting the connection with a TLS alert message. With LuaSec, this can be
achieved by using the verifyext "lsec_continue" flag.
We also need to use the lsec_ignore_purpose flag, because XMPP s2s uses server
certificates as "client" certificates (for mutual TLS verification in outgoing
s2s connections).
Commit 99d2100d2918 moved these settings out of the defaults and into mod_s2s,
because we only really need these changes for s2s, and they should be opt-in,
rather than automatically applied to all TLS services we offer.
That commit was incomplete, because it only added the flags for incoming
direct TLS connections. StartTLS connections are handled by mod_tls, which was
not applying the lsec_* flags. It previously worked because they were already
in the defaults.
This resulted in incoming s2s connections with "invalid" certificates being
aborted early by OpenSSL, even if settings such as `s2s_secure_auth = false`
or DANE were present in the config.
Outgoing s2s connections inherit verify "none" from the defaults, which means
OpenSSL will receive the cert but will not terminate the connection when it is
deemed invalid. This means we don't need lsec_continue there, and we also
don't need lsec_ignore_purpose (because the remote peer is a "server").
Wondering why we can't just use verify "none" for incoming s2s? It's because
in that mode, OpenSSL won't request a certificate from the peer for incoming
connections. Setting verify "peer" is how you ask OpenSSL to request a
certificate from the client, but also what triggers its built-in verification.
| author | Matthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| date | Tue, 01 Apr 2025 17:26:56 +0100 |
| parent | 12975:d10957394a3c |
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local crypto = require "prosody.util.crypto"; local json = require "prosody.util.json"; local hashes = require "prosody.util.hashes"; local base64_encode = require "prosody.util.encodings".base64.encode; local base64_decode = require "prosody.util.encodings".base64.decode; local secure_equals = require "prosody.util.hashes".equals; local bit = require "prosody.util.bitcompat"; local hex = require "prosody.util.hex"; local rand = require "prosody.util.random"; local s_pack = require "prosody.util.struct".pack; local s_gsub = string.gsub; local v4_public = {}; local b64url_rep = { ["+"] = "-", ["/"] = "_", ["="] = "", ["-"] = "+", ["_"] = "/" }; local function b64url(data) return (s_gsub(base64_encode(data), "[+/=]", b64url_rep)); end local valid_tails = { nil; -- Always invalid "^.[AQgw]$"; -- b??????00 "^..[AQgwEUk0IYo4Mcs8]$"; -- b????0000 } local function unb64url(data) local rem = #data%4; if data:sub(-1,-1) == "=" or rem == 1 or (rem > 1 and not data:sub(-rem):match(valid_tails[rem])) then return nil; end return base64_decode(s_gsub(data, "[-_]", b64url_rep).."=="); end local function le64(n) return s_pack("<I8", bit.band(n, 0x7F)); end local function pae(parts) if type(parts) ~= "table" then error("bad argument #1 to 'pae' (table expected, got "..type(parts)..")"); end local o = { le64(#parts) }; for _, part in ipairs(parts) do table.insert(o, le64(#part)..part); end return table.concat(o); end function v4_public.sign(m, sk, f, i) if type(m) ~= "table" then return nil, "PASETO payloads must be a table"; end m = json.encode(m); local h = "v4.public."; local m2 = pae({ h, m, f or "", i or "" }); local sig = crypto.ed25519_sign(sk, m2); if not f or f == "" then return h..b64url(m..sig); else return h..b64url(m..sig).."."..b64url(f); end end function v4_public.verify(tok, pk, expected_f, i) local h, sm, f = tok:match("^(v4%.public%.)([^%.]+)%.?(.*)$"); if not h then return nil, "invalid-token-format"; end f = f and unb64url(f) or nil; if expected_f then if not f or not secure_equals(expected_f, f) then return nil, "invalid-footer"; end end local raw_sm = unb64url(sm); if not raw_sm or #raw_sm <= 64 then return nil, "invalid-token-format"; end local s, m = raw_sm:sub(-64), raw_sm:sub(1, -65); local m2 = pae({ h, m, f or "", i or "" }); local ok = crypto.ed25519_verify(pk, m2, s); if not ok then return nil, "invalid-token"; end local payload, err = json.decode(m); if err ~= nil or type(payload) ~= "table" then return nil, "json-decode-error"; end return payload; end v4_public.import_private_key = crypto.import_private_pem; v4_public.import_public_key = crypto.import_public_pem; function v4_public.new_keypair() return crypto.generate_ed25519_keypair(); end function v4_public.init(private_key_pem, public_key_pem, options) local sign, verify = v4_public.sign, v4_public.verify; local public_key = public_key_pem and v4_public.import_public_key(public_key_pem); local private_key = private_key_pem and v4_public.import_private_key(private_key_pem); local default_footer = options and options.default_footer; local default_assertion = options and options.default_implicit_assertion; return private_key and function (token, token_footer, token_assertion) return sign(token, private_key, token_footer or default_footer, token_assertion or default_assertion); end, public_key and function (token, expected_footer, token_assertion) return verify(token, public_key, expected_footer or default_footer, token_assertion or default_assertion); end; end function v4_public.new_signer(private_key_pem, options) return (v4_public.init(private_key_pem, nil, options)); end function v4_public.new_verifier(public_key_pem, options) return (select(2, v4_public.init(nil, public_key_pem, options))); end local v3_local = { _key_mt = {} }; local function v3_local_derive_keys(k, n) local tmp = hashes.hkdf_hmac_sha384(48, k, nil, "paseto-encryption-key"..n); local Ek = tmp:sub(1, 32); local n2 = tmp:sub(33); local Ak = hashes.hkdf_hmac_sha384(48, k, nil, "paseto-auth-key-for-aead"..n); return Ek, Ak, n2; end function v3_local.encrypt(m, k, f, i) assert(#k == 32) if type(m) ~= "table" then return nil, "PASETO payloads must be a table"; end m = json.encode(m); local h = "v3.local."; local n = rand.bytes(32); local Ek, Ak, n2 = v3_local_derive_keys(k, n); local c = crypto.aes_256_ctr_encrypt(Ek, n2, m); local m2 = pae({ h, n, c, f or "", i or "" }); local t = hashes.hmac_sha384(Ak, m2); if not f or f == "" then return h..b64url(n..c..t); else return h..b64url(n..c..t).."."..b64url(f); end end function v3_local.decrypt(tok, k, expected_f, i) assert(#k == 32) local h, sm, f = tok:match("^(v3%.local%.)([^%.]+)%.?(.*)$"); if not h then return nil, "invalid-token-format"; end f = f and unb64url(f) or nil; if expected_f then if not f or not secure_equals(expected_f, f) then return nil, "invalid-footer"; end end local m = unb64url(sm); if not m or #m <= 80 then return nil, "invalid-token-format"; end local n, c, t = m:sub(1, 32), m:sub(33, -49), m:sub(-48); local Ek, Ak, n2 = v3_local_derive_keys(k, n); local preAuth = pae({ h, n, c, f or "", i or "" }); local t2 = hashes.hmac_sha384(Ak, preAuth); if not secure_equals(t, t2) then return nil, "invalid-token"; end local m2 = crypto.aes_256_ctr_decrypt(Ek, n2, c); if not m2 then return nil, "invalid-token"; end local payload, err = json.decode(m2); if err ~= nil or type(payload) ~= "table" then return nil, "json-decode-error"; end return payload; end function v3_local.new_key() return "secret-token:paseto.v3.local:"..hex.encode(rand.bytes(32)); end function v3_local.init(key, options) local encoded_key = key:match("^secret%-token:paseto%.v3%.local:(%x+)$"); if not encoded_key or #encoded_key ~= 64 then return error("invalid key for v3.local"); end local raw_key = hex.decode(encoded_key); local default_footer = options and options.default_footer; local default_assertion = options and options.default_implicit_assertion; return function (token, token_footer, token_assertion) return v3_local.encrypt(token, raw_key, token_footer or default_footer, token_assertion or default_assertion); end, function (token, token_footer, token_assertion) return v3_local.decrypt(token, raw_key, token_footer or default_footer, token_assertion or default_assertion); end; end function v3_local.new_signer(key, options) return (v3_local.init(key, options)); end function v3_local.new_verifier(key, options) return (select(2, v3_local.init(key, options))); end return { pae = pae; v3_local = v3_local; v4_public = v4_public; };