Software / code / prosody
File
spec/net_http_parser_spec.lua @ 13801:a5d5fefb8b68 13.0
mod_tls: Enable Prosody's certificate checking for incoming s2s connections (fixes #1916) (thanks Damian, Zash)
Various options in Prosody allow control over the behaviour of the certificate
verification process For example, some deployments choose to allow falling
back to traditional "dialback" authentication (XEP-0220), while others verify
via DANE, hard-coded fingerprints, or other custom plugins.
Implementing this flexibility requires us to override OpenSSL's default
certificate verification, to allow Prosody to verify the certificate itself,
apply custom policies and make decisions based on the outcome.
To enable our custom logic, we have to suppress OpenSSL's default behaviour of
aborting the connection with a TLS alert message. With LuaSec, this can be
achieved by using the verifyext "lsec_continue" flag.
We also need to use the lsec_ignore_purpose flag, because XMPP s2s uses server
certificates as "client" certificates (for mutual TLS verification in outgoing
s2s connections).
Commit 99d2100d2918 moved these settings out of the defaults and into mod_s2s,
because we only really need these changes for s2s, and they should be opt-in,
rather than automatically applied to all TLS services we offer.
That commit was incomplete, because it only added the flags for incoming
direct TLS connections. StartTLS connections are handled by mod_tls, which was
not applying the lsec_* flags. It previously worked because they were already
in the defaults.
This resulted in incoming s2s connections with "invalid" certificates being
aborted early by OpenSSL, even if settings such as `s2s_secure_auth = false`
or DANE were present in the config.
Outgoing s2s connections inherit verify "none" from the defaults, which means
OpenSSL will receive the cert but will not terminate the connection when it is
deemed invalid. This means we don't need lsec_continue there, and we also
don't need lsec_ignore_purpose (because the remote peer is a "server").
Wondering why we can't just use verify "none" for incoming s2s? It's because
in that mode, OpenSSL won't request a certificate from the peer for incoming
connections. Setting verify "peer" is how you ask OpenSSL to request a
certificate from the client, but also what triggers its built-in verification.
| author | Matthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| date | Tue, 01 Apr 2025 17:26:56 +0100 |
| parent | 13378:db30ffbf2090 |
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local http_parser = require "net.http.parser"; local sha1 = require "util.hashes".sha1; local parser_input_bytes = 3; local function CRLF(s) return (s:gsub("\n", "\r\n")); end local function test_stream(stream, expect) local chunks_processed = 0; local success_cb = spy.new(function (packet) assert.is_table(packet); if packet.body ~= false then assert.is_equal(expect.body, packet.body); end if expect.chunks then if chunks_processed == 0 then assert.is_true(packet.partial); packet.body_sink = { write = function (_, data) chunks_processed = chunks_processed + 1; assert.equal(expect.chunks[chunks_processed], data); return true; end; }; end end end); local function options_cb() return { -- Force streaming API mode body_size_limit = expect.chunks and 0 or nil; buffer_size_limit = 10*1024*2; }; end local parser = http_parser.new(success_cb, error, (stream[1] or stream):sub(1,4) == "HTTP" and "client" or "server", options_cb) if type(stream) == "string" then for chunk in stream:gmatch("."..string.rep(".?", parser_input_bytes-1)) do parser:feed(chunk); end else for _, chunk in ipairs(stream) do parser:feed(chunk); end end if expect.chunks then assert.equal(chunks_processed, #expect.chunks); end assert.spy(success_cb).was_called(expect.count or 1); end describe("net.http.parser", function() describe("parser", function() it("should handle requests with no content-length or body", function () test_stream( CRLF[[ GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com ]], { body = ""; } ); end); it("should handle responses with empty body", function () test_stream( CRLF[[ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 0 ]], { body = ""; } ); end); it("should handle simple responses", function () test_stream( CRLF[[ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 7 Hello ]], { body = "Hello\r\n", count = 1; } ); end); it("should handle chunked encoding in responses", function () test_stream( CRLF[[ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Transfer-Encoding: chunked 1 H 1 e 2 ll 1 o 0 ]], { body = "Hello", count = 3; } ); end); it("should handle a stream of responses", function () test_stream( CRLF[[ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 5 Hello HTTP/1.1 200 OK Transfer-Encoding: chunked 1 H 1 e 2 ll 1 o 0 ]], { body = "Hello", count = 4; } ); end); it("should correctly find chunk boundaries", function () test_stream({ CRLF[[ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Transfer-Encoding: chunked ]].."3\r\n:)\n\r\n"}, { count = 1; -- Once (partial) chunks = { ":)\n" }; } ); end); it("should reject very large request heads", function() local finished = false; local success_cb = spy.new(function() finished = true; end) local error_cb = spy.new(function() finished = true; end) local parser = http_parser.new(success_cb, error_cb, "server", function() return { head_size_limit = 1024; body_size_limit = 1024; buffer_size_limit = 2048 }; end) parser:feed("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n"); for i = 1, 64 do -- * header line > buffer_size_limit parser:feed(string.format("Header-%04d: Yet-AnotherValue\r\n", i)); if finished then -- should hit an error around half-way break end end if not finished then parser:feed("\r\n") end assert.spy(success_cb).was_called(0); assert.spy(error_cb).was_called(1); assert.spy(error_cb).was_called_with("header-too-large"); end) end); it("should handle large chunked responses", function () local data = io.open("spec/inputs/http/httpstream-chunked-test.txt", "rb"):read("*a"); -- Just a sanity check... text editors and things may mess with line endings, etc. assert.equal("25930f021785ae14053a322c2dbc1897c3769720", sha1(data, true), "test data malformed"); test_stream(data, { body = string.rep("~", 11085), count = 3; }); end); end);