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util/sasl/scram.lua @ 13073:9e5802b45b9e
mod_tokenauth: Only check if expiry of expiring tokens
Some tokens, e.g. OAuth2 refresh tokens, might not have their lifetime
explicitly bounded here, but rather be bounded by the lifetime of
something else, like the OAuth2 client.
Open question: Would it be better to enforce a lifetime on all tokens?
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 12 Apr 2023 10:21:32 +0200 |
parent | 12975:d10957394a3c |
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-- sasl.lua v0.4 -- Copyright (C) 2008-2010 Tobias Markmann -- -- All rights reserved. -- -- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -- -- * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -- * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -- * Neither the name of Tobias Markmann nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -- -- THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. local s_match = string.match; local type = type local base64 = require "prosody.util.encodings".base64; local hashes = require "prosody.util.hashes"; local generate_uuid = require "prosody.util.uuid".generate; local saslprep = require "prosody.util.encodings".stringprep.saslprep; local nodeprep = require "prosody.util.encodings".stringprep.nodeprep; local log = require "prosody.util.logger".init("sasl"); local binaryXOR = require "prosody.util.strbitop".sxor; local _ENV = nil; -- luacheck: std none --========================= --SASL SCRAM-SHA-1 according to RFC 5802 --[[ Supported Authentication Backends scram_{MECH}: -- MECH being a standard hash name (like those at IANA's hash registry) with '-' replaced with '_' function(username, realm) return stored_key, server_key, iteration_count, salt, state; end Supported Channel Binding Backends 'tls-unique' according to RFC 5929 ]] local default_i = 10000 local function validate_username(username, _nodeprep) -- check for forbidden char sequences for eq in username:gmatch("=(.?.?)") do if eq ~= "2C" and eq ~= "3D" then return false end end -- replace =2C with , and =3D with = username = username:gsub("=2C", ","); username = username:gsub("=3D", "="); -- apply SASLprep username = saslprep(username); if username and _nodeprep ~= false then username = (_nodeprep or nodeprep)(username); end return username and #username>0 and username; end local function hashprep(hashname) return hashname:lower():gsub("-", "_"); end local function get_scram_hasher(H, HMAC, Hi) return function (password, salt, iteration_count) if type(password) ~= "string" or type(salt) ~= "string" or type(iteration_count) ~= "number" then return false, "inappropriate argument types" end if iteration_count < 4096 then log("warn", "Iteration count < 4096 which is the suggested minimum according to RFC 5802.") end password = saslprep(password); if not password then return false, "password fails SASLprep"; end local salted_password = Hi(password, salt, iteration_count); local stored_key = H(HMAC(salted_password, "Client Key")) local server_key = HMAC(salted_password, "Server Key"); return true, stored_key, server_key end end local function scram_gen(hash_name, H_f, HMAC_f, get_auth_db, expect_cb) local profile_name = "scram_" .. hashprep(hash_name); local function scram_hash(self, message) local support_channel_binding = false; if self.profile.cb then support_channel_binding = true; end if type(message) ~= "string" or #message == 0 then return "failure", "malformed-request" end local state = self.state; if not state then -- we are processing client_first_message local client_first_message = message; -- TODO: fail if authzid is provided, since we don't support them yet local gs2_header, gs2_cbind_flag, gs2_cbind_name, authzid, client_first_message_bare, username, clientnonce = s_match(client_first_message, "^(([pny])=?([^,]*),([^,]*),)(m?=?[^,]*,?n=([^,]*),r=([^,]*),?.*)$"); if not gs2_cbind_flag then return "failure", "malformed-request"; end if support_channel_binding and gs2_cbind_flag == "y" then -- "y" -> client does support channel binding -- but thinks the server does not. return "failure", "malformed-request"; end if gs2_cbind_flag == "n" then -- "n" -> client doesn't support channel binding. if expect_cb then log("debug", "Client unexpectedly doesn't support channel binding"); -- XXX Is it sensible to abort if the client starts -PLUS but doesn't use channel binding? end support_channel_binding = false; end if support_channel_binding and gs2_cbind_flag == "p" then -- check whether we support the proposed channel binding type if not self.profile.cb[gs2_cbind_name] then return "failure", "malformed-request", "Proposed channel binding type isn't supported."; end else -- no channel binding, gs2_cbind_name = nil; end username = validate_username(username, self.profile.nodeprep); if not username then log("debug", "Username violates either SASLprep or contains forbidden character sequences.") return "failure", "malformed-request", "Invalid username."; end self.username = username; -- retrieve credentials local stored_key, server_key, salt, iteration_count; if self.profile.plain then local password, status = self.profile.plain(self, username, self.realm, authzid) if status == nil then return "failure", "not-authorized" elseif status == false then return "failure", "account-disabled" end password = saslprep(password); if not password then log("debug", "Password violates SASLprep."); return "failure", "not-authorized", "Invalid password." end salt = generate_uuid(); iteration_count = default_i; local succ; succ, stored_key, server_key = get_auth_db(password, salt, iteration_count); if not succ then log("error", "Generating authentication database failed. Reason: %s", stored_key); return "failure", "temporary-auth-failure"; end elseif self.profile[profile_name] then local status; stored_key, server_key, iteration_count, salt, status = self.profile[profile_name](self, username, self.realm, authzid); if status == nil then return "failure", "not-authorized" elseif status == false then return "failure", "account-disabled" end end local nonce = clientnonce .. generate_uuid(); local server_first_message = ("r=%s,s=%s,i=%d"):format(nonce, base64.encode(salt), iteration_count); self.state = { gs2_header = gs2_header; gs2_cbind_name = gs2_cbind_name; username = self.username; -- Reference property instead of local, in case it was modified by the profile nonce = nonce; server_key = server_key; stored_key = stored_key; client_first_message_bare = client_first_message_bare; server_first_message = server_first_message; } return "challenge", server_first_message else -- we are processing client_final_message local client_final_message = message; local client_final_message_without_proof, channelbinding, nonce, proof = s_match(client_final_message, "(c=([^,]*),r=([^,]*),?.-),p=(.*)$"); if not proof or not nonce or not channelbinding then return "failure", "malformed-request", "Missing an attribute(p, r or c) in SASL message."; end local client_gs2_header = base64.decode(channelbinding) local our_client_gs2_header = state["gs2_header"] if state.gs2_cbind_name then -- we support channelbinding, so check if the value is valid our_client_gs2_header = our_client_gs2_header .. self.profile.cb[state.gs2_cbind_name](self); end if client_gs2_header ~= our_client_gs2_header then return "failure", "malformed-request", "Invalid channel binding value."; end if nonce ~= state.nonce then return "failure", "malformed-request", "Wrong nonce in client-final-message."; end local ServerKey = state.server_key; local StoredKey = state.stored_key; local AuthMessage = state.client_first_message_bare .. "," .. state.server_first_message .. "," .. client_final_message_without_proof local ClientSignature = HMAC_f(StoredKey, AuthMessage) local ClientKey = binaryXOR(ClientSignature, base64.decode(proof)) local ServerSignature = HMAC_f(ServerKey, AuthMessage) if StoredKey == H_f(ClientKey) then local server_final_message = "v="..base64.encode(ServerSignature); return "success", server_final_message; else return "failure", "not-authorized", "The response provided by the client doesn't match the one we calculated."; end end end return scram_hash; end local auth_db_getters = {} local function init(registerMechanism) local function registerSCRAMMechanism(hash_name, hash, hmac_hash, pbkdf2) local get_auth_db = get_scram_hasher(hash, hmac_hash, pbkdf2); auth_db_getters[hash_name] = get_auth_db; registerMechanism("SCRAM-"..hash_name, {"plain", "scram_"..(hashprep(hash_name))}, scram_gen(hash_name:lower(), hash, hmac_hash, get_auth_db)); -- register channel binding equivalent registerMechanism("SCRAM-"..hash_name.."-PLUS", {"plain", "scram_"..(hashprep(hash_name))}, scram_gen(hash_name:lower(), hash, hmac_hash, get_auth_db, true), {"tls-unique", "tls-exporter"}); end registerSCRAMMechanism("SHA-1", hashes.sha1, hashes.hmac_sha1, hashes.pbkdf2_hmac_sha1); registerSCRAMMechanism("SHA-256", hashes.sha256, hashes.hmac_sha256, hashes.pbkdf2_hmac_sha256); end return { get_hash = get_scram_hasher; hashers = auth_db_getters; getAuthenticationDatabaseSHA1 = get_scram_hasher(hashes.sha1, hashes.hmac_sha1, hashes.pbkdf2_hmac_sha1); -- COMPAT init = init; }