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util/x509.lua @ 12181:783056b4e448 0.11 0.11.12
util.xml: Do not allow doctypes, comments or processing instructions
Yes. This is as bad as it sounds. CVE pending.
In Prosody itself, this only affects mod_websocket, which uses util.xml
to parse the <open/> frame, thus allowing unauthenticated remote DoS
using Billion Laughs. However, third-party modules using util.xml may
also be affected by this.
This commit installs handlers which disallow the use of doctype
declarations and processing instructions without any escape hatch. It,
by default, also introduces such a handler for comments, however, there
is a way to enable comments nontheless.
This is because util.xml is used to parse human-facing data, where
comments are generally a desirable feature, and also because comments
are generally harmless.
author | Jonas Schäfer <jonas@wielicki.name> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 10 Jan 2022 18:23:54 +0100 |
parent | 8555:4f0f5b49bb03 |
child | 9907:54e36a8677bc |
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-- Prosody IM -- Copyright (C) 2010 Matthew Wild -- Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Aurich -- -- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the -- COPYING file in the source package for more information. -- -- TODO: I feel a fair amount of this logic should be integrated into Luasec, -- so that everyone isn't re-inventing the wheel. Dependencies on -- IDN libraries complicate that. -- [TLS-CERTS] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125 -- [XMPP-CORE] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6120 -- [SRV-ID] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4985 -- [IDNA] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890 -- [LDAP] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4519 -- [PKIX] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 local nameprep = require "util.encodings".stringprep.nameprep; local idna_to_ascii = require "util.encodings".idna.to_ascii; local base64 = require "util.encodings".base64; local log = require "util.logger".init("x509"); local s_format = string.format; local _ENV = nil; -- luacheck: std none local oid_commonname = "2.5.4.3"; -- [LDAP] 2.3 local oid_subjectaltname = "2.5.29.17"; -- [PKIX] 4.2.1.6 local oid_xmppaddr = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"; -- [XMPP-CORE] local oid_dnssrv = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"; -- [SRV-ID] -- Compare a hostname (possibly international) with asserted names -- extracted from a certificate. -- This function follows the rules laid out in -- sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 of [TLS-CERTS] -- -- A wildcard ("*") all by itself is allowed only as the left-most label local function compare_dnsname(host, asserted_names) -- TODO: Sufficient normalization? Review relevant specs. local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) if norm_host == nil then log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host) return false end norm_host = norm_host:lower() local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label for i=1,#asserted_names do local name = asserted_names[i] if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); return true end -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" if name:match("^%*%.") then local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); return true end end end return false end -- Compare an XMPP domain name with the asserted id-on-xmppAddr -- identities extracted from a certificate. Both are UTF8 strings. -- -- Per [XMPP-CORE], matches against asserted identities don't include -- wildcards, so we just do a normalize on both and then a string comparison -- -- TODO: Support for full JIDs? local function compare_xmppaddr(host, asserted_names) local norm_host = nameprep(host) for i=1,#asserted_names do local name = asserted_names[i] -- We only want to match against bare domains right now, not -- those crazy full-er JIDs. if name:match("[@/]") then log("debug", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s because it's not a bare domain", name) else local norm_name = nameprep(name) if norm_name == nil then log("info", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s, failed nameprep!", name) else if norm_host == norm_name then log("debug", "Cert xmppAddr %s matched hostname", name) return true end end end end return false end -- Compare a host + service against the asserted id-on-dnsSRV (SRV-ID) -- identities extracted from a certificate. -- -- Per [SRV-ID], the asserted identities will be encoded in ASCII via ToASCII. -- Comparison is done case-insensitively, and a wildcard ("*") all by itself -- is allowed only as the left-most non-service label. local function compare_srvname(host, service, asserted_names) local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) if norm_host == nil then log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host); return false end -- Service names start with a "_" if service:match("^_") == nil then service = "_"..service end norm_host = norm_host:lower(); local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label for i=1,#asserted_names do local asserted_service, name = asserted_names[i]:match("^(_[^.]+)%.(.*)"); if service == asserted_service then if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); return true; end -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" if name:match("^%*%.") then local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name) return true end end if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); return true end end end return false end local function verify_identity(host, service, cert) if cert.setencode then cert:setencode("utf8"); end local ext = cert:extensions() if ext[oid_subjectaltname] then local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname]; -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 6.3, 6.4.4, "a client MUST NOT seek a match for a -- reference identifier if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID -- SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types" local had_supported_altnames = false if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then had_supported_altnames = true if service == "_xmpp-client" or service == "_xmpp-server" then if compare_xmppaddr(host, sans[oid_xmppaddr]) then return true end end end if sans[oid_dnssrv] then had_supported_altnames = true -- Only check srvNames if the caller specified a service if service and compare_srvname(host, service, sans[oid_dnssrv]) then return true end end if sans["dNSName"] then had_supported_altnames = true if compare_dnsname(host, sans["dNSName"]) then return true end end -- We don't need URIs, but [TLS-CERTS] is clear. if sans["uniformResourceIdentifier"] then had_supported_altnames = true end if had_supported_altnames then return false end end -- Extract a common name from the certificate, and check it as if it were -- a dNSName subjectAltName (wildcards may apply for, and receive, -- cat treats) -- -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 1.8, a CN-ID is the Common Name from a cert subject -- which has one and only one Common Name local subject = cert:subject() local cn = nil for i=1,#subject do local dn = subject[i] if dn["oid"] == oid_commonname then if cn then log("info", "Certificate has multiple common names") return false end cn = dn["value"]; end end if cn then -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 6.4.4, follow the comparison rules for dNSName SANs. return compare_dnsname(host, { cn }) end -- If all else fails, well, why should we be any different? return false end local pat = "%-%-%-%-%-BEGIN ([A-Z ]+)%-%-%-%-%-\r?\n".. "([0-9A-Za-z+/=\r\n]*)\r?\n%-%-%-%-%-END %1%-%-%-%-%-"; local function pem2der(pem) local typ, data = pem:match(pat); if typ and data then return base64.decode(data), typ; end end local wrap = ('.'):rep(64); local envelope = "-----BEGIN %s-----\n%s\n-----END %s-----\n" local function der2pem(data, typ) typ = typ and typ:upper() or "CERTIFICATE"; data = base64.encode(data); return s_format(envelope, typ, data:gsub(wrap, '%0\n', (#data-1)/64), typ); end return { verify_identity = verify_identity; pem2der = pem2der; der2pem = der2pem; };