File

mod_muc_config_restrict/mod_muc_config_restrict.lua @ 5705:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parent 1014:ed7431fd3b47
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local is_admin = require "core.usermanager".is_admin;
local t_remove = table.remove;

local restricted_options = module:get_option_set("muc_config_restricted", {})._items;

function handle_config_submit(event)
	local stanza = event.stanza;
	if is_admin(stanza.attr.from, module.host) then return; end -- Don't restrict admins
	local fields = event.fields;
	for option in restricted_options do
		fields[option] = nil; -- Like it was never there
	end
end

function handle_config_request(event)
	if is_admin(event.actor, module.host) then return; end -- Don't restrict admins
	local form = event.form;
	for i = #form, 1, -1 do
		if restricted_options[form[i].name] then
			t_remove(form, i);
		end
	end
end

module:hook("muc-config-submitted", handle_config_submit);
module:hook("muc-config-form", handle_config_request);