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mod_muc_config_restrict/mod_muc_config_restrict.lua @ 5705:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parent | 1014:ed7431fd3b47 |
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local is_admin = require "core.usermanager".is_admin; local t_remove = table.remove; local restricted_options = module:get_option_set("muc_config_restricted", {})._items; function handle_config_submit(event) local stanza = event.stanza; if is_admin(stanza.attr.from, module.host) then return; end -- Don't restrict admins local fields = event.fields; for option in restricted_options do fields[option] = nil; -- Like it was never there end end function handle_config_request(event) if is_admin(event.actor, module.host) then return; end -- Don't restrict admins local form = event.form; for i = #form, 1, -1 do if restricted_options[form[i].name] then t_remove(form, i); end end end module:hook("muc-config-submitted", handle_config_submit); module:hook("muc-config-form", handle_config_request);