prosody-modules
527c747711f3
mod_host_blacklist/mod_host_blacklist.lua

Find changesets by keywords by author, files, the commit message, revision number or hash, or revset expression.

Software / code / prosody-modules

File

mod_host_blacklist/mod_host_blacklist.lua @ 5705:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parent 1182:547b3c05cc06
line wrap: on
line source

local jid_split = require "util.jid".split;
local st = require "util.stanza";
local set = require "util.set";
local select = select;

local blacklist = module:get_option_inherited_set("host_blacklist", {});

local function stanza_checker(attr)
	return function (event)
		local host = select(2, jid_split(event.stanza.attr[attr]));
		if blacklist:contains(host) then
			module:send(st.error_reply(event.stanza, "cancel", "not-allowed", "Communication with this domain is restricted"));
			return true;
		end
	end
end

check_incoming_stanza = stanza_checker("from");
check_outgoing_stanza = stanza_checker("to");

for stanza_type in set.new{"presence","message","iq"}:items() do
	for jid_type in set.new{"bare", "full", "host"}:items() do
		module:hook("pre-"..stanza_type.."/"..jid_type, check_outgoing_stanza, 500);
		module:hook(stanza_type.."/"..jid_type, check_incoming_stanza, 500);
	end
end