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mod_auth_pam/mod_auth_pam.lua @ 5705:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parent | 1538:57bb2497fadc |
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-- PAM authentication for Prosody -- Copyright (C) 2013 Kim Alvefur -- -- Requires https://github.com/devurandom/lua-pam -- and LuaPosix local posix = require "posix"; local pam = require "pam"; local new_sasl = require "util.sasl".new; function user_exists(username) return not not posix.getpasswd(username); end function test_password(username, password) local h, err = pam.start("xmpp", username, { function (t) if #t == 1 and t[1][1] == pam.PROMPT_ECHO_OFF then return { { password, 0} }; end end }); if h and h:authenticate() and h:endx(pam.SUCCESS) then return user_exists(username), true; end return nil, true; end function get_sasl_handler() return new_sasl(module.host, { plain_test = function(sasl, ...) return test_password(...) end }); end module:provides"auth";